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of a factor. Norwegian Plow Co. v. Clark, 102 Iowa 31, 71 N. W. 808.
In most jurisdictions, money has not been held to form an exception to the
rule stated. Maine Bank v. Thomas, 28 Ill. 463; Davis v. Smith, 29 Minn.
201, 12 N. W. 531; In re State Bank, 56 Minn. 119, 57 N. W. 336; Rozelle
v. Rhodes, 116 Pa. St. 129, 9 Atl. 160; Shoemaker v. Hinze, 53 Wis. 116,
10 N. W. 86.
Even in Texas it has been held that "a special deposit is the placing
of something in the custody of the bank of which special restitution must
be made

.

.

.

to be kept by the bank and specifically returned and

form no part of the bank's disposable capital." Tyler County State Bank v.
Rhodes, 256 S. W. 947 (Tex. Civ. App.). Would the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals have said in the Shivers case, supra, that the payment of interest
entitled the bank to use the thing deposited as part of the "bank's disposable
property?"
It is submitted that, on the facts and reasoning of the cases cited above,
the relation between the parties was not that of bailor and bailee. It is
suggested that the agreement created the relation of creditor and debtorthat there was a mere loan-a time deposit here. If the plaintiff and the
bank became creditor and debtor respectively, it necessarily follows that the
plaintiff was not entitled to a preference.
T. R. D.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-TORT ACTION BY WIFE AGAINST HusBAND-The

plaintiff sustained injuries in an automobile accident while riding with
her husband, the defendant. The plaintiff brings this action for damages
for said injuries. The defendant interposes a demurrer to the complaint.
Held: Demurrer sustained. Blickenstaff v. Blickenstaff. Appellate Court
of Indiana, July 5, 1929, 167 N. E. 146.
By the fiction of the common law the husband and wife became one
legal person. The legal existence of the woman was merged in that of the
husband; the woman lost all legal identity by marriage. 1 Blackstone's
Commentaries 442. The inability of a wife to sue her husband at common
law was based on the principle that the husband and wife were one in law,
and not upon the theory that the wife was under legal disability. Barnett
v. Harshbarger,105 Ind. 410; Henneger v. Lomas, 145 Ind. 287. At common law a married woman had no substantive rights. "There is not only
no civil remedy but no civil right during coverture to be redressed at any
time." Phillips v. Barnett, 1 Q. B. D. 436. It has been decided that the
statute giving married women greater liberty in bringing suits merely
changes the procedure, but gives no new rights. Henneger v. Lomas, supra.
The above fiction has been broken in Indiana by the following statute:
Burns' Ann. St. 1926, Sections 8738-8762, and 262. It is said that to
allow a wife to sue her husband in tort is opposed to public policy. It is
submitted that such a suit is no more against public policy than a divorce
suit in which the entire marriage relation is exposed; and also, after
a husband commits a tort on his wife the sanctity of the marriage relation,
which public policy seeks to protect, has been destroyed.
"A married woman may sue alone--First. When the action concerns
her separate property. Second. When the action is between herself and
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her husband." Burns' Ann. St. 1926, Sec. 262. This section has been construed to mean that married women may sue their husbands when the
actions concern their separate property, Dailey v. Dailey, 26 Ind. App. 14,
but in all other cases the common law is left unchanged. Hamm v. Romine,
98 Ind. 177. A wife's right of action for an injury in the nature of a tort
is property, it is the separate property of the wife. Musselman v. Galligher,
32 Iowa 383; The C. B. & Q. R. Co. v. Dunn, 52 Ill. 260; Barnett v. Leonard,
66 Ind. 422. It is submitted that this principle does not bring the present
case under the above statute because that which is denied cannot be assumed, namely, that the wife does have a right of action against her husband for tort.
The following, cases have held that a wife may sue her husband in tort.
Johnson v. Johnson, 77 So. 335; Fitzpatrick v. Owens, 186 S. W. 832;
Brown v. Brown, 89 A. 889; Gilman v. Gilman, 95 A. 657; Fiedurv.Fiedur,
140 P. 1022. "The foundation of legal identity has been so substantially
changed that, except as disabilities have been retained, each has against
the other all the rights of persons not so related." Johnson v. Johnson,
supra. "Should a woman who has been crippled for life through the malicious assault of a brutal husband, go into court and ask for alimony for
her support, there is not a court but what would award her a more liberal
alimony than if she were a strong, able woman. This additional alimony
would be allowed on the ground of the tort she had received at the hands
of her husband. There is no difference in principle between a direct and
indirect recovery for tort." Fiedur v. Fiedur, supra.
There is a growing inclination to construe statutes concerning married
women's rights liberally, and, if possible, to give the wife a right of action
in tort against her husband thereunder and not to consider it as opposed
to public policy to do so. 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 186.
J.A. B.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS-TRANSPORTING-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCEPolice officers found appellant sitting in front seat of his automobile, which
was standing between certain barns at the fairgrounds. He was alone.
There were forty pints or half pints of liquor in the back seat. Before he
was arrested, he told the officers that he had gotten the liquor in Osgood.
There was no evidence except that which was given by the state. Appellant
was tried by the court and found guilty on the second count of the affidavit
which charged him with unlawfully manufacturing, transporting, and shipping intoxicating liquor, and by the judgment of the court he was fined
in the sum of $200, and sentenced to imprisonment on the Indiana state
farm for 90 days. On appeal he raised the question of the sufficiency of this
evidence to sustain the convictiojn as charged. Affirmed, Reynolds v. State,
Appellate Court of Indiana, 167 N. E. 544. (August 1, 1929.)
The opinion states: "From this evidence, the court evidently inferred
that appellant drove the automobile from Osgood into the fairgrounds,
with the liquor in it-a reasonable inference, no less so than in the following
cases which were affirmed by the Supreme Court: Lowery v. State, 196 Ind.
316, 147 N. E. 151; Simpson v. State, 196 Ind. 499, 149 N. E. 50; Payne v.
State, 194 Ind. 365, 142 N. E. 651; Lowery v. State, 199 Ind. 180, 156
N. E. 161."

